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Petri-net based models have been extensively used for per- 
formance &  performability modeling to analyze computer & com- 
munication systems [  1 - 71. However, in the dependability model- 
ing co-unity,  Petri-net based models have received co~i&rably 
less attention [8 - 101. This paper describes a methodology to con- 
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Summary  &  Conclusions - This  paper  describes  a 
methodology to construct dependability models using generalized 
stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) and stochastic reward nets (SRN). 
Algorithms are provided to convert a fault tree (a commonly used 
combinatorial model type) model into equivalent GSPN and SRN 
models. In a fault-tree model, various kinds of  distributions can 
be assigned to components such as defective failure-time distribu- 
tion, nondefective  failuretime distribution,  or a failure probability. 
The paper describes subnet constructions for each of these different 
cases, and shows how to incorporate repair in these models. 
We consider the cases: 1) Each component has an indepen- 
dent repair facility. 2) Several components share a repair facility; 
such repair dependency cannot be  modeled by combinatorial model 
types such as  fault trees. We illustrate how such dependencies and 
various scheduling disciplines (for the repair queue) such as first- 
come first-served (FCFS), processor-sharing, preemptive priority 
with resume, and non-preemptive  priority repair, can be modeled 
by GSPN & SRN. If the operational dependence of  a system on 
its components is specified by means of  a fault-tree and a repair 
dependence  is  described  in  some  (other)  form,  then  our 
methodology provides an  automatic way to generate GSPN & SRN 
models of  system dependability. 
The subnet constructions  allow us to compare SRN with GSPN 
as dependability model  types. For the dependability models of 
repairable systems, the complexity (number of  places and transi- 
tions) of  GSPN models is appreciably higher than the complexity 
of  equivalent SRN  models.  The state-space of  the underlying 
continuous-time  Markov  chain  (CTMC)  remains  the  same, 
however. Thus SRN reduce the complexity of  model specification 
at the net level, but the complexity of  model solution remains the 
same. Since SRN include all the features of GSPN, the additional 
features of  SRN such as reward rates, variable cardinality arcs, 
halting condition, and timed transition priorities, greatly simplify 
model construction & specification. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Acronyms' 
CTMC  Continuous Time Markov Chain 
FCFS  First Come First Served 
FTRE  Fault Tree with Repeated Events 
GSPN  Generalized Stochastic Petri Net\\ 
'The  singular & plural of  an acronym are always spelled the same. 
struct dependability models using Petri nets. Among the Petri- 
net based model types, we consider GSPN [2] and SRN [l  11. 
SRN extend the GSPN, ie, they include all the features 
of GSPN and many more, eg, guards (previously called enabl- 
ing functions), timed transition priorities, variable cardinality 
arcs, halting condition, and reward rates. None of these exten- 
sions enhances the modeling power since every SRN model can 
be converted to a CTMC which are isomorphic to GSPN [2]; 
although SRN allow calculation of some reward-based measures 
which are not possible through GSPN [12]. Thus any system 
that can be modeled by a SRN can also be modeled by a GSPN. 
However, SRN and GSPN differ in the conciseness of model 
specification. SRN permit a much more concise description of 
system dependability than GSPN do. An aim of this paper is 
to bring out this distinction  among these two different Petri-net 
model types. By  converting dependability models specified as 
FTRE models to equivalent GSPN and SRN models, we  il- 
lustrate how the features of SRN greatly simplify the model con- 
struction.  A  popular  software  tool  for  GSPN  models  is 
GreatSPN [13] and for SRN models is SPNP [12]. 
The model types used for dependability are in 2 categories: 
1) combinatorial, and 2) state-space. Among  the former are 
reliability block diagrams, fault trees,  and reliability graphs. 
State-space model types include continuous-time Markov chains 
and Petri-net based models. Ref  [14] compares various com- 
binatorial model  types based on their modeling  power, and 
shows that FTRE is the most powerful combinatorial model 
type. The major handicap of combinatorial model types is that 
they cannot model certain kinds of dependencies, the most com- 
mon one being the repair dependency among components where 
several components share a repair facility. 
We first illustrate how an FTRE [15, 161 model can be 
converted to an equivalent GSPN or SRN model, and provide 
algorithms for these conversions. These algorithms can be easily 
modified to convert a reliability block diagram or reliability 
graph into GSPN or SRN models. The subnet constructions in- 
volved in these conversions are based on the kind of distribu- 
tion assigned to each component of the system. For instance, 
in an FTRE model, it is common to assign failure probabilities 
(a distribution  with mass at time zero and mass at infinity which 
sum to one) to each component, or assign a failure-time distribu- 
tion in which a component can be faulty from the very  start 
of system operation (mass at time zero). We illustrate subnet 
constructions for such commonly occurring cases. 
0018-9529/95/$4.00 01995 IEEE MALHOTWRIVEDI: DEPENDABILITY MODELING USING PETRI NETS  429 
We then show how  repair dependencies such as shared 
repair persons between various components of a system, which 
cannot be modeled by FTRE models, can be modeled by Petri- 
net based models. Failed components queue up for repair if the 
repair facility is busy. The repair requests in the queue can be 
serviced according to some scheduling discipline such as FCFS, 
processor-sharing , non-preemptive priority,  and preemptive 
resume priority. We provide GSPN & SRN subnet construc- 
tions for these 4  scheduling disciplines. These constructions pro- 
vide insight into the differences between GSPN and SRN and 
reveal that certain features of SRN can be very useful in suc- 
cinctly capturing failure-repair characteristics of systems. For 
a given system whose operational dependency on components 
is specified by  an FTRE model (or any combinatorial model 
type), our methodology provides a direct way to construct a 
GSPN or a SRN model which incorporates repair dependen- 
cies among the components. For other applications of SRN to 
dependability modeling, refer to [17 - 191. 
Section 2 briefly introduces Petri nets. Section 3 describes 
2 examples that are used throughout this paper:  1) a simple 
series-parallel system, and 2) a more complex multiprocessor 
system. Sections 4  & 5 describe how an FTRE reliability model 
without repair can be converted into equivalent GSPN and SRN 
models respectively. Section 6 describes how to introduce repair 
(without any repair dependency) in GSPN and SRN models. 
Section 7 describes how to introduce repair (without dependen- 
cy) into GSPN & SRN models. Section 8 describes how to in- 
corporate  repair  (with dependency -  shared repair  facility 
among components) and different queuing disciplines in GSPN 
and SRN models. 
Notation 
x.up, x.dn  a place where the presence of a token implies that 
component x is [up, down] 
a transition implying failure 
a place where the presence of a token implies that the 
system is down 
time instant 
Pr{component is in  state i at time t} 
steady-state probability of being in state i 
reward rate in marking i 
set of tangible markings 
[steady-state, instantaneous] reward rate, a r.v. 
continuous-time Markov chain 
state-space of  Cp (t) 
transition rate from state i to state j,  i #j 
a number chosen such that q  2  maxi{  Iqi,il} 
infinitesimal generator matrix of Z(  t) 
state probability vector of  Cp(t) at time t 
initial state probability vector of Cp(t) 
steady-state probability vector of  Cp (t) 
[memory, processor] module i 
interconnection network 
disk j  of processing subsystem i 
time to failure of a component, a r.v. 
failure rate of the component 
X 
Ci 
P 
RC[x] 
#tokens(x)  number of tokens in place x  of a Petri net 
Ci  component i 
pi  repair rate of Ci 
Xi  priority of tfansition ti. 
Other, standard notation is given in “Information for Readers 
& Authors”  at the rear of each issue. 
a node in an FTRE 
input (child) i to a gate (AND or OR) 
constant probability-mass at time OD 
reachability-count of  node with label x 
2.  PETRI NETS 
A Petri net [20] is a directed bipartite graph with 2 dis- 
joint  sets of  nodes: places  and  transitions.  In  a  graphical 
representation of a Petri net, places are represented by circles, 
and transitions are represented by bars. In a Petri net, there are 
a finite number of places and transitions. Nodes are connected 
by  directed edges. A place is an input to a transition if there 
is an edge from the place to the transition. That edge is an in- 
put arc. A place is an output of a transition if there is an edge 
from the transition to the place. That edge is an output arc. An 
integral multiplicity can be associated with each input and out- 
put arc (default is 1). 
A Petri net is marked if tokens are associated with the 
places. The dynamic behavior of the system is determined by 
the movement of tokens. The tokens move based upon thejr- 
ing of transitions. A transition is enabled to fire if the number 
of tokens in each of its input places is at least equal to the 
multiplicity of the corresponding input arc from that place. 
When a transition fires, tokens are removed from each of its 
input places and deposited in each of its output places. The 
number of tokens removed from each of the input places of a 
firing transition is equal to the multiplicity of the correspon- 
ding input arc; the number of tokens deposited in its output 
places is equal to the multiplicity of the corresponding output 
arc. At any instant of time, more than one transition can be 
enabled but only one transition is allowed to fire. In a graphical 
representation of a Petri net, tokens are denoted by small dots 
or integers within a place. Multiplicity of arcs is denoted by 
putting a backslash on the arc and placing a positive integer with 
it. If  multiplicity is not indicated, then default multiplicity of 
1 is assumed. 
A marking of a Petri net is the distribution of tokens in 
the set of places of the Petri net. Thus firing of a transition results 
in a new marking. Each marking defines a state of the system. 
If the number of tokens in the net is bounded, then there are 
a finite number of markings. A marking is reachabZe from an 
original marking if there is a sequence of transition firings star- 
ting from the original marking which results in that marking. 
The reachability set (graph)  of a Petri net is the set of all mark- 
ings that are reachable from the initial marking. 
Petri nets have been extended for increased ease of  use 
and enhanced modeling power. For instance, inhibitor arcs can 
be allowed that prevent firing of a transition when there is a ~ 
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token in any one of its inhibitor input places. Most important- 
ly, firing times can be associated with transitions. When the 
distribution  of firing times for all transitions is exponential, the 
net is a stochastic Petri net (SPN) [5].  Ajmone-Marsan et a1 
[2] proposed generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) which 
allow transitions to have 0 firing time (immediate transitions) 
or exponentially distributed firing times (timed transitions). SPN 
& GSPN are equivalent to CTMC. Extensions that allow non- 
exponential distributions are discussed in [2 11. There are 2 types 
of markings of a GSPN:  1) vanishing (at least one immediate 
transition  is  enabled  in  that  marking),  and  2)  tangible 
(otherwise). 
Ciardo et a1 [  121 introduced  structural extensions to GSPN 
eg 9 
enabling functions (guards) for transitions -  transitions enabl- 
ed based on some explicitly stated conditions and not just on 
distribution of tokens in input places, 
marking dependent arc multiplicities, 
timed transition priorities. 
The resulting net with all these extensions can still be converted 
to a CTMC. However, there are tradeoffs with these extensions. 
Whereas these extensions  make the task of modeling very sim- 
ple and reduce the size of the net considerably, the complexity 
of understanding does increase. Ciardo et a1 [l] also introduc- 
ed stochastic reward nets (SRN). SRN differ from GSPN in 
that reward rates (numerical values) are specifiable at the net 
level and translate into a reward rate being associated with each 
marking of the net. Use of reward rates reduces the size of the 
net because many aspects of  a system that would have to be 
modeled explicitly by places & transitions in a GSPN can be 
expressed by  arithmetic and  Boolean expressions involving 
reward rates in an SRN. 
Example 2-CPS 
P.up  P.  f  1  P.  dn 
PQ.fl  sys.dn 
Q*~P  Q*fl  Q.dn 
Figure 1.  GSPN Model of a 2-Component Parallel System 
There  is  a  2-component  parallel2  system.  The  com- 
ponents are labeled P & Q. Figure 1 is the GSPN reliability 
model. Firing of the transition Z.fl  represents the failure of com- 
ponent W ( W=  P,Q).  It results in removal of the token from 
the place W.up  and its deposit in the place W.dn. A constant 
'The  terms, series & parallel are used in their logic-diagram sense, 
irrespective of  the  schematic-diagram or  physical-layout. 
failure rate of component W is associated with this transition. 
Transition  PQ.fl is an immediate  transition which fires iff there 
is a token in place P.dn and a token in place Q.dn (both P & 
Q  have failed). This results in a token being deposited in the 
place sys.dn, which implies failure of the system. 
The system unreliability at time t is: 
Pr{there is a token in place sys.dn at time t}. 
The analytic solution of this GSPN model requires conversion 
of the GSPN model to a Markov model and computation  of the 
probability of being in the srate, corresponding to the marking 
of the net in which there is one token in place sys.dn at time t. 
P.up  Q-UP 
P.dn  Q.dn 
Figure 2.  SRN Model of a 2-Component Parallel System 
Figure 2 is a SRN reliability model of  this system. The 
reward rate assignment to compute the reliability of the system 
is: 
if (number of tokens in P.up = = 1) or (number of tokens in 
Q.up == 1) 
then reward rate = 1 (system is operational) 
else reward rate = 0 (system is down) 
endif 
The mean value of the reward rate at time t gives the reliability 
of the system at time t.  Thus SRN  computes system dependabili- 
ty  measures as reward-based measures. Compared with the 
GSPN model in figure 1, the SRN model in figure 2 does not 
need the 3 extra places  (P.dn, Q.dn, sys.dn) nor an extra im- 
mediate transition (PQ.fl). The purpose of these added places 
& transitions is to check whether the system is failed in a given 
marking. The specification of reward rates obviates this explicit 
Other measures can also be computed as reward-based 
checking.  4 
metrics. 
E{Z}  =  ri.?ri, 
(no time is spent in the vanishing markings). 
iE3 
E{Z(t)}  =  ri*Pi(t). 
iE3 
Similarly,  accumulated reward  measures  [I] can  also  be 
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The ai &  pi  (t)  can be computed by  solving the underly-  based on this example are therefore generic and apply to any 
system with such dependencies.  ing CTMC obtained from the SRN. 
I  Notation 
{9(t),  t  2 0}  CTMC with state-space 
n  {l,2, ... ,n}. 
Q  [qijl 
qi,i  -  qij:  infinitesimal  generator  matrix ofthe CTMC 
n 
j=lj#i 
4  maxi I  4i,i  I 
P(t)  [P1(t)9~2(t),  >  pn(t)l 
n  [7F*,K2, ...  9  Knl. 
AB 
Figure 4.  FTRE Model of the Series-ParallelSystem  in Figure 3 
Example 3.2 considers a more complex system whose sub- 
systems have series and parallel dependencies, and it is easy 
to see how the conclusions from a simple model carry over to 
the models of complex systems. More complex dependencies 
[25] such as k-out-of-n dependence also occur in practice, but 
our purpose is served by  illustrating with this simple series- 
State i is the same as marking i. 
P(t)  is computed by solving a system of first order linear dif- 
ferential (Kolmogorov) equations  : 
= P(t)xQ; 
dt  parallel system. 
the initial condition is specified by  P(0). 
For numerical solution, see [22, 231. 
ll is obtained by  solving a system of linear equations: 
3.2 A Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor System 
ll*Q  = 0, 
n 
Kj  = 1. 
i= 1 
For numerical solution, see [24]. 
3.  EXAMPLES USED 
These 2 examples are used throughout this paper. 
I  I- 
I 
Figure 5.  Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor System 
3.1 A Series-Parallel System 
El--- 
Figure 3.  A  3-Component Series-Parallel System 
A series-parallel system has 3 components A, B,  C,  as 
shown in figure 3. The system is operational as long as compo- 
nent C and at least one of components  A or B are operational. 
Dependability of this system can be modeled by the FTRE  model 
shown in figure 4. Any real fault-tolerant system typically con- 
sists of subsystems, many of which have series and parallel 
dependencies on basic components. The conclusions we draw 
A 
JI 
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Figure 5 shows the fault-tolerant multiprocessor system 
which  consists of  2  processors Pi  (i= 1,2) with  a  private 
memory Mi.  A processor and a memory form a processing 
unit.  Each  processing unit  is  connected to a  mirrored disk 
system. This forms a processing subsystem. Memory module 
M3 is shared by P,  & P2.  If Ml, M2, or both Ml & M2  fail, 
then both the processing subsystems continue to function since 
P1 & P2 can both access M3 if necessary. However, if M, & 
M3 fail, then the processing subsystem of P1  fails. Both the 
processing subsystems and M3 are connected via an intercon- 
nection network N.  The system is functional iff N is functional 
and 1 of the processing subsystems is functional. For a pro- 
cessing subsystem to  be  functional, the processor, memory 
module or shared  memory module, and 1 of the 2 mirrored disks 
must be functional. For simplicity and sake of illustration, we 
restrict ourselves to this 2 processor system. This architecture 
is  easily  scaled  to  many  processors.  The reliability of  this 
multiprocessor system is modeled by the FTRE in figure 6. M3 
is a repeated event in this model. 
4.  CONVERTING FTRE TO GSPN 
This  section illustrates how  an  FTRE model of  a non- 
repairable system can be  converted to  an  equivalent GSPN 
model. 
Assumption (unless otherwise stated) 
1. The time-to-failure and time-to-repair distributions of 
In principle, one could convert an FTRE to a Markov chain 
[26] and then convert the Markov chain into a GSPN model 
[14]. However, the GSPN model could be totally non-intuitive 
and appreciably less compact than the one obtained by careful 
design. Our direct conversion algorithm yields more-compact 
and more-intuitive GSPN models. 
To generate the equivalent GSPN model, we must con- 
sider the input associated with the basic events in the FTRE 
model. This could be the time-to-failure distribution, failure 
probability, or instantaneous  unavailability of the component. 
The time-to-failure distribution can be further classified as: 
any component are exponential.  4 
mass at time 0  mass at time  00 
1. non-defective  no  no 
2. defective  Yes  no 
3. defective  Yes  Yes 
4. defective  no  yes. 
Pr{X < CO} = 1. 
Assumption 
2. Basic events as well as outputs of gates can be shared 
(repeated).  4 
Conversion Algorithm 
Oa.  For each event: Count the number of times an event 
(basic or output of a gate) is repeated and set RC[x] .  Then RC[x] 
is at least 1 for each x,  unless there is some error in the specifica- 
tion of the FTRE. 
Ob.  For each node x: set DONE[x] -  FALSE (this in- 
dicates that the subnet for this componentlgate has not been 
generated). 
/* These two steps, Oa  & Ob,  can be carried out in O(n)  time 
(n  is the number of events in the FTRE).  */ 
1. Use Algorithm FTRE-to-GSPN(x)  in table 1. 
/* This is a postorder traversal of the FTRE starting from the 
root. The equivalent GSPN model is obtained by  calling this 
procedure;  x points to the top gate of the FTRE. This algorithm 
is recursive (calls itself).  */ 
TABLE  1 
Conversion Algorithm for FTRE to GSPN 
Algorithm FTRE-to-GSPN(x) 
begin 
if (x # NIL) then 
Test True 
Case  (x is a basic event) and  (DONE[x]  = = FALSE): 
Construct the subnet in figure 7a and  label each place; 
DONE[x] -  TRUE; EndCase 
Let c1. ....  ,cx be the inputs (children) of  x 
foreach cj,  i -  1, ...,  x do 
Construct the subnet in  figure 7b 
DONE[x] -  TRUE; EndCase 
Let c,,  ....,  cx be the inputs  (children) of x 
foreach ci, i -  1, ...,  x  do 
Construct  the subnet in figure 7c 
DONE[x] -  TRUE; EndCase 
Case (x is an AND gate): 
FTRE-to-GSPN(ci) 
Case  (x is an OR gate): 
FTRE-to-GSPN(ci) 
EndTest 
Endlf 
end 
Construct inhibitor arcs from root.dn to all the timed transitions. 
Case 1 is discussed in detail. Cases 2 & 3 are discussed briefly 
since they can be handled in a similar fashion. Case 4  is not 
discussed because it does not commonly occur in practice. 
4.1 Non-defective Failure-Time Distribution 
Pr{X=O)  = 0, 
At the end, after the postorder traversal of the entire FTRE 
is completed, construct inhibitor arcs from the place root.dn 
(the dn place for the top gate in the FTRE) to all the timed tran- 
sitions. This is done so that after the system fails, failure of 
operational components is disallowed to prevent generation of 
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underlying Markov chain. Thus, both storage & time are saved 
since a smaller Markov chain needs to be generated &stored. 
Pr{X=O)  = 1 -  p, 
2.up 
c1 .dn 
q.dn 
c,.dn 
cl.dn 
cpdn 
c,.dn 
b. 
0' 
I 
I 
x.dn  I 
C. 
Figure 7.  GSPN Subnets for Converting an FTRE Model to a 
GSPN Model 
The complexity of the GSPN model can be expressed in 
terms of number of places & transitions. After this conversion 
algorithm, then: 
#(places) L 2 .#(components) + #(gates) 
#(timed transitions) = #(components) 
#(immediate transitions)  2 #(AND  gates)  + E,  E OR 
#(inputs to gate g) 
gates 
The number of immediate transitions & places could be more 
than the sum on the r.h.s.  if any of the OR  gates in the FTRE 
are repeated since an extra place and immediate transition (see 
the dashed rectangular box in figure 7c) are needed in that case. 
The GSPN models obtained from converting the FTRE 
models  of  the  series-parallel  system  (figure  4)  and  the 
multiprocessor system (figure 6)  are shown in figures 8 & 9 
respectively. They show how the subnet constructions for the 
series-parallel dependence carry over from the simple series- 
parallel system to the more complex multiprocessor system. 
3.2 Failure-Time Distribution with Mass at t =O 
A defective distribution with probability 1  -p  at time 0 is 
assigned to each component. 
B.up 
A.up 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
sys.dn 
Figure 8.  GSPN Model of the Series-Parallel  System in Figure 
4 
Figure 9.  GSPN Model of the Multiprocessor System in Figure 
6 
P  x.up 
1-P 
Figure 10.  GSPN Subnet when Failure-Time Distribution Has 
Mass at  t- 0 
A common example occurs when a component can be faul- 
ty in the beginning (time 0) with some probability. To model 434 
such a scenario, we need to modify figure 7a as shown in figure 
10. Another way to look at this is to compute a new initial-state 
distribution. The initial distribution is: 
With probability p,  there is one token in place x.up at the 
start and with probability 1  -p, there is a token in place x.dn 
at the start. Figures 7b & 7c remain the same and so does the 
algorithm in table 1. 
4.3 Failure-Time Distribution with Mass at t = 0 & 00 
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I  W 
P 
Figure 11.  GSPN Subnet with Specified Failure-Probability of 
a Component 
A constant failure probability 1  -p is assigned to each com- 
ponent. Looking at it as a distribution of defectives implies that 
there is probability 1  -p at time 0 and probability p at time 03. 
Pr{X = 00) = p. 
An  example occurs when a component is either faulty or 
fault-free (does not fail as time progresses) from the very start 
of system operation. To model this scenario, we need to modify 
figure 7a as shown in figure 11. Figures 7b & 7c remain the 
same and so does the algorithm in table 1. 
4.4  Discussion 
In all these cases (sections  4.1 - 4.3),  the algorithm to con- 
struct the overall GSPN model remains the same.  Only the 
subnet for each component changes depending upon the kind 
of distribution assigned to each component, By  virtue of our 
constructions, this methodology extends to the case where a 
defective failure-time distribution is specified for some com- 
ponents  while  a  non-defective  failure-time  distribution  is 
specified for the others. The important thing is proper labeling 
of places x.dn and x.up in the subnet for a component x. Once 
these places have been generated for each component  x, the con- 
struction of the rest of the net remains the same regardless of 
the kind of distribution assigned to each component. 
5.  CONVERTING FTRE TO SRN 
This section illustrates how an FTRE reliability model (no 
repair) can be converted to an equivalent SRN model. In the 
process of doing so, we hope to distinguish between SRN and 
GSPN. As we did for GSPN in section 4,  we discuss different 
cases based on the kind of failure-time distributions assigned 
to the basic events in the FTRE model. 
5.1 Non-Defective Failure-time Distribution 
The algorithm to convert an FTRE into an SRN is based 
on a similar postorder traversal of  the FTRE as the algorithm 
(table 1) for converting an FTRE to a GSPN. The difference 
is in the actions taken when a node is encountered. Every time 
a gate is encountered, instead of constructing a subnet of im- 
mediate  transitions  and  places,  a  reward  rate  function  is 
constructed. 
Unlike the conversion to GSPN, we do not need to per- 
form the preprocessing step to count the number of times an 
event (basic or output of a gate) is repeated, because the value 
of RC[x] is not needed in this algorithm. For each node x, set 
DONE[x] -  FALSE. The remaining steps are carried out by 
a postorder traversal of the FTRE starting from the root. Every 
time a node (a basic event or a gate) is encountered, a specific 
action is  performed.  Table  2  shows the  algorithm  for  the 
postorder tree-traversal 
TABLE 2 
Conversion Algorithm for FTRE to SRN 
Algorithm FTRE-toSRN(x) 
begin 
if  (x #  NIL) then 
Test True 
Case (x is  a basic event) and (DONE[x] = = FALSE): 
Construct the subnet in figure 7a and label each place; 
boo@) -  (#token(x.dn) == 1) 
DONE[x] -  TRUE;  EndCase 
Let c,, ....,  cx be the inputs (children) of  x 
foreach ci. i -  1, ...,  x do 
Case (x is an AND gate): 
FTRE-to-SRN(ci) 
bool(x) -  bool(c,)  A bool(c2) A  ... A bool(cx) 
DONE[x] -  TRUE;  EndCase 
Case (x is an OR gate): 
Let c1,  ....,  c+ be the inputs (children) of  x 
foreach ci, i -  1,  ...,  x do 
FTRE-to-SRN(ci) 
bool(x) -  bool(cl)  V bool(cz) V  ... V bool(c+) 
DONE[x] -  TRUE;  EndCase 
EndTest 
Endlf 
end 
if  (bool(root) = = 1) 
then disable all the transitions in the net. 
endif 
The idea behind the halting condition is to prevent generation 
of unnecessary markings. Suppose that the system fails due to 
failure of some components, and is shut down. This shut-down 
implies that no more activity takes place in the system, ie, opera- 
tional components can no longer fail. Thus, all the transitions 
within the system must be disabled. If the transitions are not MALHOTRmRIVEDI:  DEPENDABILITY MODELING USING PETRI  NETS  435 
Gate  Boolean Function 
bool(G2) 
.  bool(G1) 
(#tokens(A.dn) == 1) A (#tokens(B.dn) == 1) 
bl(G1)  V (#tokens(C.dn)  == 1) 
disabled, then many more markings will be generated, each of 
which represent a system failure state. The halting-condition 
disables all the transitions after system failure and prevents 
generation of these unnecessary markings. 
The  SRN  model  is  obtained  by  calling: 
FTREto-SRN(root),  The reliability of the system is specified 
by the reward function: 
if (bool(root) ==  0) 
then r=l (system is operational) 
else r=O  (system is failed) 
endif 
The system reliability at time t is computed as the mean value 
of the reward rate r at time t. 
QQ  9 
A  A  A 
Halting Condition 
if (bool(G1)  == 1) then disable all the transitions 
Figure 12.  SRN Model of the Series-Parallel  System in Figure 4 
The SRN  models obtained from converting the FTRE 
models  of  the  series-parallel  system  (figure  4)  and  the 
multiprocessor system (figure 6)  are shown in figures 12 & 13 
respectively. bool(G1) is used to specify the system reliability 
in both the cases. Upon comparing these SRN models with the 
equivalent GSPN models in figures 8 & 9 we note: 
SRN models replace the mesh of immediate transitions and 
places in GSPN models by  a reward rate assignment. 
The use of the halting condition in SRN avoids the need of 
inhibitor arcs to prevent generation of unnecessary markings. 
4 
5.3 Failure-Time Distribution with Mass at t  = 0 & 00 
The SRN subnet for each component is the same as the 
GSPN subnet in figure 11. 
Ml.dn  PI.&  Dll.dn  Dll.dn  N.dn 
Halting Condition 
if (bool(G1)  == 1) then disable all the transitions 
Figure 13.  SRN Model of the Multiprocessor System in Figure 
6 
5.4 Discussion 
In these cases (sections 5.1 - 5.3)  the SRN model consists 
simply  of  such  subnets for each  component, unlike GSPN 
models which need the mesh of immediate transitions, places, 
and inhibitor arcs. 
6.  MODELING REPAIR 
(Without Repair-Dependencies) 
The complexity of the SRN model in figure 13 is: 
#(places) = 2 - #(components) 
#(timed transitions) = #(components) 
#(immediate transitions) = 0 
5.2 Failure-Time Distribution with Mass at t=O 
The SRN subnet for each component is the same as the 
GSPN subnet in figure 10. 
In sections 3 - 5 the system was non-repairable. We now 
consider how to model repairable systems. In practice, the repair 
of  a failed component consists of  calling the repair person, 
removal of bugs, purchase of new component, replacement of 
faulty component, installing the new component, reconfigur- 
ing the new component, and testing the new component. For 
simplicity & illustration, we group all these steps together into 
a collective action called repair. Combinatorial-model  types such 
as reliability block diagrams, FTRE, and reliability graphs, can 
model only the case where each component of the multiprocessor 
system has an s-independent repair person. 436  IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 44, NO. 3,1995 SEPTEMBER 
6.1 GSPN Models  hibitor arcs in the mesh of immediate transitions and places. 
We also need to introduce a complementary mirrored subnet 
to remove appropriately the tokens from the places which in- 
dicate different subsystem failures in order to reflect compo- 
nent repair. We call this subnet complementary since the AND 
plemented: AND becomes OR and vice-versa. 
If processor P2 fails 
r---------‘---- 
I  & OR dependencies of subsystems or components are com- 
For example, consider place A in the GSPN in figure 15. 
I 
I  OR if both disks D21  AND 42  have failed 
OR if both memory modules M2 AND M3  have failed, 
then there will be a token in place A. After repair, suppose that 
none of the 3 conditions hold, then we must remove the token 
from place A; ie, 
if  ‘P2  is up’ AND  ‘either of disks 02,  OR 022  is up’ AND 
U  B.dn 
L--------------J 
Figure 14.  GSPN  Model  of  the  Series-Parallel System  (in 
Figure 4) with Repair 
,_______._._._.___......., 
I  I 
‘either of M2 OR M3 is up’, 
then we must remove the token from place A. These conditions 
are complementary to the conditions which led to the deposit 
of a token in place A. The complementary subnet modeling these 
conditions is enclosed in the dashed rectangular box in figures 
14 & 15. The leftmost immediate transition in these boxes has 
no output place; ie, the tokens disappear when this transition 
fires. 
One of  the other modifications required  is the need of 
several inhibitor arcs on the immediate transitions (both in the 
original subnet and its complementary subnet) to prevent these 
transitions from continuously firing (since at least one of the 
input places to these transitions is also one of the output places). 
Thus, unless the inhibitor arcs are used, these transitions will 
fire indefinitely. An algorithm to convert an FTRE model where 
each component has its own repair facility into a GSPN model 
can be derived based on the arguments given here. It will be 
similar to the algorithm in table 1. Various output measures can 
be computed from this model. Steady-state  probability of a token 
sient probability of a token in place PF gives instantaneous 
unavailability of the system. 
PF 
1  I  in place PF gives steady-state unavailability of the system. Tran- 
._____._._..._____.-.---.~ 
Figure 15.  BSPN  Model  of the  Multiprocessor  System  (in 
Figure 6) with  Repair 
The  Of  the GSPN  with  repair is: 
#(places) 2 2 -#(components) + 2 .#(gates) 
The GSPN models of the series-parallel system and the 
multiprocessor  system  where  each  component  has  its  s- 
independent repair facility are shown in figures 14 & 16 respec- 
tively. In these models, we have not shown the inhibitor arcs 
(to disable failure transitions after system failure) for sake of 
clarity, but they are present just as in the models in figures 8 
& 9. Comparing the GSPN models with and without repair, 
figures 8 & 14 and figures 9 & 15, we find that it is not enough 
to introduce only the repair transitions to model repair of com- 
ponents. In the GSPN models without repair (figures 8 & 11) 
the flow of  tokens is  l-way  and that keeps the net  simple. 
However, when repair is introduced (figures 14 & 15) the flow 
of tokens is 2-way, and that requires more output arcs and in- 
#(timed transitions) = 2 .#(components) 
#(immediate transitions) L CgEgates  (#(inputs to gate g) +-  1) 
The complexity of the complementary net (number of places 
& transitions) is nearly the same as the complexity of the original 
net (modeling the FTRE with no repair). Thus, the size of the 
GSPN nearly doubles in order to model repair. 
6.2 SRN Models 
The SRN models of the series-parallel  system and the multi- 
processor system where each component has an s-independent 437  MALHOTR"RIVED1:  DEPENDABILITY MODELING USING PETRI NETS 
Figure 16. 
D21 .UP 
#  Dzl .dn 
#  MI  .dn 
M1.u~ 
Figure 17. 
A.up  B.up  c.up 
U 
A.dn 
U 
B.dn 
W 
C.dn 
SRN Model of the Series-Parallel  System (in Figure 
4)  with  Repair 
SRN Model of the Multiprocessor System (in Figure 
6)  with  Repair 
repair facility are shown in figures 16 & 17. Comparing these 
models with the GSPN models in figures 14 & 15, the usefulness 
of SRN over GSPN becomes obvious. The only modification 
needed for the SRN models in figures 12 & 13  is to add transi- 
tions for repair of components. The Boolean function bool(G1) 
which was used to specify the reward function for reliability 
of the series-parallel and the multiprocessor system (figures 12 
& 13 respectively) can also be used to specify the reward func- 
tion for the availability of the systems. However, there is no 
halting condition in  this case since the system is repairable 
(repair transitions must not be disabled after system failure). 
Instead,  there are guards  for each failure transition.  These 
guards disable the failure transitions while the system is down 
(ie,  components do not fail while the system is down). The guard 
for each failure transition in the SRN model in both figures 16 
& 17 would be: 
if (bool(G,) == 1) 
then disable the transition\\ 
else enable the transition 
endif 
A guard is specified for each transition independently. The 
failure transitions are enabled once the system is operational 
again. Contrasting the SRN models with the eauivalent GSPN 
models where a complementary subnet of about the same size 
as the original subnet must be constructed to model the repair 
of  components, the SRN models more succinctly capture the 
failure-repair behavior of a system than do the GSPN models. 
Besides the standard output measures such as instantaneous 
& steady-state availability, we can also compute cumulative up 
(or down) time of the system until time t. This is done by com- 
puting the accumulated reward in the system up (or down) states. 
The complexity of  the SRN models with repair is: 
#(places) = 2  - #(components) 
#(timed transitions) = 2 .#(components) 
#(immediate transitions) = 0. 
7.  MODELING REPAIR 
(With Repair-Dependencies) 
Section 6 considered the simple case where each compo- 
nent of a system has its s-independent repair facility. In prac- 
tice, this is not the case. Usually, repair facilities are shared 
among components. If a component fails while the repair facility 
is busy, then it has to queue for service. Components that queue 
for service are serviced according to some scheduling policy. 
This section shows how to model a) such repair dependency, 
and b)  various  scheduling disciplines using  GSPN & SRN 
models. Example 3-CPS is used in sections 7.1 - 7.4. 
Example 3-CPS 
Aparallel system has 3 components C,,  C2, C3  that share 
a repair facility R. The repair discipline is different for each 
4  case. 
7.1 FCFS Repair Discipline 
Example 3-CPS is used with the repair discipline: Com- 
ponents that arrive for repair at a repair facility are served in 
the order of arrival. 
1 / 
1  1 
I 
91 
1 
1  -0  ~~-  ----  .  ~~~.  -__.  .  Figure 18.  SRN Subnet for Modeling FCFS Repair Discipline 438  IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY. VOL. 44, NO. 3.1995 SEPTEMBER 
Cl.dnl  1 
I 
I  1 
I  I 
Figure 19.  GSPN Subnet for Modeling FCFS Repair Discipline 
Figure 18 shows the SRN subnet for this discipline. The 
component that arrives for repair first, grabs the token from 
place R  (ie, grabs the repair facility) and releases it only after 
repair is completed. The FCFS queue is modeled by the places 
Q,,  Q2,  or Q3  and the immediate transitions and inhibitor arcs 
between them. Each Ci is identified by  i tokens in any of the 
places Q,, Q2,  Q3.  The arcs with a ‘2’  like sign are variable 
cardinality arcs, a special feature of SRN. Each time transition 
tqi  (i  =  1,2  ) fires, it removes as many tokens as present in Qi 
and places them in Qi+  ,. The reward rate r for availability of 
this system is: 
if  ((#tokens(Cl.up)  == 1)  V  (#tokens(C2.up) == 1)  V 
(#tokens(C3.up) = = 1)) 
then r = 1 (system is up) 
else r = 0 (system is down) 
endif 
Figure 19 shows the GSPN subnet of the same system with 
FCFS repair queue. This differs from the SRN subnet only in 
4 
Since GSPN do not allow variable cardinality arcs, we need 
to model explicitly  that behavior [  121, and the net becomes ap- 
preciably complicated. 
the modeling of the FCFS queue. 
7.2 Preemptive Resume Priority (PRP) Repair Discipline 
Example 3-CPS is used with the PRP repair discipline: 
Components that arrive for repair at a repair facility are served 
in the order of component priority -  that priority decreases 
in the order C,, C2, C3. 
Figure 20.  SRN Subnet for  Modeling PRP Repair Discipline 
I  I 
1  I 
Figure 21.  GSPN Subnet for Modeling PRP Repair Discipline 
If  a high priority component  needs repair while a low 
priority component is being repaired, then the repair of  low 
priority component is preempted and resumed after the repair 
of  high  priority  component  is  completed.  By  virtue  of 
memoryless property of exponential distribution, the amount 
of remaining repair time has the same distribution as the original 
repair time. 
Figure 20 shows the SRN model for this system. Priority 
xi, i=1,2,3 (xl  > x2 > x3)  is assigned to the timed transi- 
tion tri. An enabled timed transition is disabled if another tim- 
ed transition with higher priority is enabled before this transi- 
tion fires.  This models the  PRP repair discipline. Although 
the repair facility is a shared resource which is in contention 
when more than one component has failed, it is not explicitly 
modeled. 
Figure 21 shows the equivalent GSPN subnet. Since GSPN 
does not allow priorities on timed transitions, the PRP repair 
discipline has to be explicitly modeled. Comparing the models 
in figures 20 & 21 shows that a simple feature of  SRN results 
in  a  appreciably  more-concise  model  specification  than 
GSPN . 
7.3 Non-Preemptive Priority  Repair  (Non-PRP) Discipline 
Example  3-CPS  is  used  with  the  Non-PRP  repair 
discipline:  Same  as PRP except that the  component which 
is being repaired currently is not preempted if a higher priori- 
ty component arrives for repair. However, after the current 
repair completes, then the highest  priority component from 
the  queued  components is  selected  for  repair. 
Figure 22 shows the GSPN model for this system. The 
priority  is  modeled  by  inhibitor arcs.  For  instance,  these 
arcs guarantee that  if  C1 and  C2 (or C3) are waiting  in  the 
queue  for  repair,  then  C1 begins  repair  first,  and  C2  (or 
C3)  is  repaired after  C1 finishes repair.  This could also be 
modeled  by  simply assigning priorities  xl, x2, x3 (xl  > x2 
> x3) respectively to  the  immediate transitions tlr t2, t3. 
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7.4 Processor Sharing (PS) Repair Discipline 
Example 3-CPS is used with the PS repair discipline: No 
queuing takes place at the repair facility. Instead, each failed 
component perceives the repair facility to be slowed by  a fac- 
tor of k if there are k failed components waiting to be repaired 
at any instant. 
Cl.dnl 
I 
C?.dnl  ‘I  .I  ‘  II 
Figure 22. 
7.5 Discussion 
The overall GSPN models in sections 7.1 - 7.4 (different 
scheduling disciplines) contain the subnets shown in the cor- 
responding figures, and the mesh of immediate transitions and 
places which models the operational dependency of the system 
onto its  components. However, compared to the  no-repair- 
dependency case (figure 15),  this mesh is more complicated 
since now there is more than one place per component where 
a token indicates failure of a component. For example, a token 
in place Cl.dnl or Cl.dn2 (figures 19 & 22) indicates that com- 
ponent C1 is down. 
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